Watts: The Decline of the Jury by Pizzi, William T.
University of Colorado Law School
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship
1997
Watts: The Decline of the Jury
William T. Pizzi
University of Colorado Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, Judges Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections
Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
Copyright Statement
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and Educational Use clauses of the U.S.
Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is required.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
erik.beck@colorado.edu.
Citation Information
William T. Pizzi, Watts: The Decline of the Jury, 9 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 303 (1997), available at http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/
667.
+ 2(,1 1/,1(
Citation: 9 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 303 1996-1997 
Provided by: 
William A. Wise Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Fri Jun  9 15:35:14 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
Federal Sentencing Reporter. Vol. 9, No. 6, May / June 1997 303
WILLIAM T. PIZZI
WATTS: THE DECLINE OF THE JURY
William T. Pizzi*
It is no secret that we have serious problems with
our trial system in the United States. To say simply
that public respect for the system is low is putting it
somewhat euphemistically. It is probably more
accurate to say that the public views our trial system
with disrespect and cynicism.
Part of the problem is that, as our system has
evolved, we have left largely undecided what are to
be the priorities at trial. In defending rules which are
not primarily concerned with uncovering the truth,
we like to say that "truth is only one of the goals of
our trial system." But we are wonderfully vague
about what the other goals are, or where truth ranks
compared to the trial system's other priorities. The
result is a system that leaves uncertain what trials are
supposed to do, and a system that will do almost
anything to avoid trial, including accepting plea
bargains that other western criminal justice systems
would not touch.' One extreme example is the
system's willingness to accept what are known as
Alford pleas, after the Supreme Court case upholding
them,2 in which a defendant is permitted to plead
guilty and receive a lengthy sentence while neverthe-
less insisting that he is innocent of the crime in
question.
Many of the problems with our trial system were
driven home to me in the Supreme Court's joint
decision of the cases of United States v. Watts and
United States v. Putra, handed down on January 6 of
this year. Vernon Watts was a dealer in cocaine base
(referred to more commonly as "crack") whose house
was lawfully searched by the police. In the course of
the search the police found more than 500 grams of
crack in a kitchen cabinet and also found two loaded
guns and ammunition hidden in a bedroom closet.
Watts was charged in federal court with possessing
cocaine base with the intent to distribute and with
using a firearm in connection with a drug offense.
The jury convicted Watts of the drug charge, but
acquitted him of the gun charge.
But Watts' problems with the gun charge were
not over, despite the acquittal. The trial judge at
sentencing concluded that Watts had possessed the
guns in connection with the drug offense and thus
decided to increase the range under which Watts was
to be sentenced. Under the strictures of the sentenc-
ing guideline system that exists in federal courts, the
judge's finding that Watts had possessed a firearm in
connection with the drug offense had the effect of
raising Watts' sentence rather substantially: he
received an additional four years of imprisonment.
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law,
Boulder.
In the companion case, Cheryl Putra suffered the
same fate as Watts.. Although she was convicted of
one count of selling cocaine and acquitted of a second
count of selling cocaine the next day (both sales
having been videotaped), the sentencing judge
concluded that Putra had committed both crimes,
thereby increasing the sentencing range. In her case,
the effect was not as severe as it was for Watts: the
minimum sentence in the range was lifted from 15
months to 27 months (which she received).
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
sentences imposed on Watts and Putra were illegal
because, according to the court, an acquittal by the
jury forecloses any increase in sentence based on the
same conduct. To permit otherwise, the court felt,
would effectively punish the defendant for conduct
that the jury had explicitly rejected as a basis of
punishment.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
ruling. In upholding what the trial judges had done,
the Court took a very technical approach to the issue
before it. The Court reasoned that the increased
sentence was permissible because the jury had to find
the defendant guilty of the gun charge beyond a
reasonable doubt, while the standard of proof at
sentencing is not as high. A judge, the Supreme
Court continued, need only find facts that support an
increase in the defendant's sentencing range by a
preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the Court
concluded, there is no inconsistency in the fact that a
judge increases a defendant's sentence on the basis of
the same conduct for which the jury has acquitted the
defendant.
The issue decided in Watts and Putra has tremen-
dous importance in our federal system because
federal judges under the sentencing guidelines are
required to take "relevant conduct" into account in
sentencing whether or not such conduct involves an
acquittal, uncharged conduct, or charges that were
dropped (such as might occur in a plea bargain). In
other words, federal judges are instructed to sentence
for what they determine are.the "real offenses"
committed by the defendant and not simply the
"conviction offenses." Many judges in state courts
would be reluctant to do openly what the federal
judges did in Watts and Putra, but federal judges
under the guidelines have no option. And now the
Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional
bar to sentencing a defendant expressly on the basis
of criminal conduct for which the defendant was
acquitted.
What is most startling about the Supreme Court
opinion is that the Court viewed the sentencing issue
before it as easy. The Court decided the case in a 7 - 2
per curiam opinion without even requiring full
briefing or hearing oral argument. The Court
apparently took the case in order to correct what it
viewed as a clear aberration among federal appellate
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courts in the Ninth Circuit's holding that "acquitted"
conduct could not provide the basis for enhancing a
sentence. And yet this issue is hardly beyond
dispute-though the Ninth Circuit was alone in its
holding, a number of thoughtful dissenting opinions
from other circuits have argued that reading the
guidelines to permit increased punishment on the
basis of acquitted conduct is wrong and unjust.3
The sterility and formalism of the Court's
reasoning reveals a great deal about the problems that
exist in our trial system. Because we cannot resolve
the purpose of a trial or, perhaps more accurately,
because trials are supposed to achieve many pur-
poses, it becomes very difficult to know what an
acquittal is supposed to mean. In this case, the Court
assumed in its opinion that the jury had dutifully
measured the evidence against the standard of proof
and found that the government's proof on the gun
charge was a bit short of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. But at other times the Court has acknowl-
edged and even seemed to value a jury's ability to
look past the law and to reach a verdict that is "just"
despite facts and instructions that would have
required a more severe result. As the Supreme Court
put it in Duncan v. Louisiana, the case which originally
held that jury trials are required in every felony
prosecution, when judges disagree with the results
reached by juries, "it is usually because [juries] are
serving some of the very purposes for which they
were created and for which they are now employed." 4
Considering the jury's role from such a broader
perspective raises a host of questions about the true
nature of the verdicts in Watts and Putra. Isn't it
possible that the juries in those cases acquitted Watts
of the gun charge and acquitted Putra of a second
drug sale because they decided that our drug penal-
ties are very high and they did not want to add more
prison time to what they knew would be substantial
prison sentences even for a single conviction? (It is
perhaps worth noting that even without the gun
possession charge, Watts, who was definitely no
angel, would have received a sentence of 18 years in
prison; with it, he received nearly 22 years.)
Or perhaps, in the case of Watts, the jury
intended to send a different message in its verdict,
namely that it did not approve of the way our federal
drug laws single out cocaine in the form of crack for
extremely harsh sentences compared to the treatment
of similar amounts of powder cocaine. The tremen-
dous disparities in the federal system between the
sentences received by black drug dealers and white
drug dealers due to the disparate consideration of
crack and cocaine have been much discussed in the
press-especially since the Sentencing Commission
took the unusual step of asking Congress to lower the
statutory penalties on crack cocaine because of those
disparities. Congress, however, overwhelmingly
refused to change the law.
Given the real possibility that the jury acquittals
in these cases represented more than a simple
determination of the weight of the evidence, does it
not amount to a rejection of the jury function to allow
(or even require) a sentencing calculation which takes
no heed of these acquittals? Even assuming that the
juries in both cases reached their verdicts as the
Supreme Court assumed they did-by a straightfor-
ward application of the law to the evidence--does it
not show some disrespect for our jury system to
permit (let alone require) a trial judge to punish a
defendant for conduct that the jury decided was not
sufficient to support the stigma of a conviction in the
first place?
That the decision in Watts and Putra seemed easy
and straightforward to the Supreme Court when it
seems to be so disrespectful of jury verdicts is very
troubling. For it was the Supreme Court that first
committed our criminal justice system to jury trials
far more strongly than any other western country
through its use in the Duncan opinion of soaring
rhetoric about the jury as an "inestimable safeguard
against the.., overzealous prosecutor and against
the compliant... judge."5 The Supreme Court has
established that jury trials are constitutionally
required in any criminal case in which a sentence of
more than six months in jail is theoretically possible,
even if the judge and the prosecutor were to agree
before trial that not one day of incarceration would
be imposed in the event of a conviction.6 (The
resulting burden on the system creates courts in
urban areas that more closely resemble third world
bazaars than courts of justice.) Yet when the system
does put a case to a jury and the jury acquits on one
of the charges, this same Court now allows an
increased sentence based on the acquitted conduct
without considering the possibility that the disagree-
ment occurred because the jury was serving "some of
the very purposes for which [juries] were created and
for which they are now employed."7
Back in 1975, Marvin Frankel, then a federal
judge, complained in a provocative essay that our
trial system did not value truth as highly as it
should.' I think that what he said then is even more
true today. Lots of lawyers and judges have grown
cynical about our trial system. The metaphor that
calls a jury trial a "crapshoot" and the outcome to be
little more than a "roll of the dice" is commonly used
when lawyers and judges speak about the system.
With this background, that the Supreme Court would
profess deep respect for juries on the one hand and
then issue an opinion that sees little of significance in
a jury acquittal is simply another reflection of the
system's cynicism about juries and trial verdicts. But,
of course, it is this same Supreme Court that created
so. much of our modern trial system and its adher-
ence to the elaborate jury trial system through
decisions that now actually stand in the way of
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reforms that might make the system more efficient
and more reliable.
Today our federal system accepts that there is
such a sizable gap between "conviction offenses"-
those for which a defendant is convicted-and "real
offenses"-those which were actually committed by
the defendant-that judges must sentence based on
the latter. Lots of other trial systems would be
concerned about the gap and would work hard to
close it. Watts and Putra seem to move us in the
opposite direction. A trial system that undervalues
truth slips easily into thinking about verdicts in this
way.
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